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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an 
international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to 
explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We 
compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 
percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment 
climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy 
to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does 
not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model 
shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more 
ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period. 
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1. Introduction and policy questions 
In this paper we analyze the proposals regarding greenhouse gas emission reduction for 
the post-2012 era put forward by the European Council during the Spring 2007 (see 
Council of the European Union, 2007 and Commission of the European Communities, 
2007a). In particular, our purpose it to assess the potential effects of the EU proposal on 
the incentives for future international cooperation on climate policy after the first 
commitment period (2008-2012) of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The policy questions we address are the 
following: 
• Will the unilateral 20% emission reduction commitment of the EU cause a “carbon 
leakage effect” in the countries who have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol (and/or 
possible subsequent developments). In other words, would they respond to the EU’s 
unilateral commitment by substantially lowering their own emission reductions and 
therefore annihilating the EU efforts? 
• What is the likely effect on non EU countries who did ratify the Kyoto agreement? 
Will they be inclined to lower or to increase their contribution to a global solution 
in response to the increase in the EU effort?  
• Will the contingent strategy of reducing emissions by 30% by 2020 if other 
industrialized countries follow, induce current outsiders to join and to step up their 
emission abatement efforts? 
• What is the role of international emissions trading as a transfer mechanism in the 
EU proposals? 
We will not study the question whether the EU proposal is in line with the broader and 
longer term objective of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system, as it is referred to in article 2 of the UNFCCC (1992). Nor will we investigate 
whether the EU proposal is sufficient to meet the European long term global climate 
objective to keep global mean temperature change below 2°C. Answering these questions 
requires a different methodology and is not the objective of our paper. These questions 
are analyzed in detail in, among others, Schellnhuber (2006), Russ et al. (2007), Russ et 
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al. (2005) and Criqui et al. (2003). We do not address either the impact the EU proposals 
will have on the European economy or what policy instruments the EU should adopt to 
meet its target. The economic costs of the alternative EU emission reduction strategies 
are documented in the assessment report accompanying the Communication of the 
European Commission (Commission of the European Communities, 2007b). A 
comprehensive appraisal of the interactions between the EU climate policy initiatives is 
analyzed in detail in Stankeviciute and Criqui (2008). 
At the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, attempts to forge a new 
climate deal for the post-2012 period were cast into a comprehensive negotiation 
framework, the so-called “Bali roadmap”, see Ott, Sterk and Watanabe (2008). This 
roadmap sketches the path for a negotiating process that should culminate in 2009 in the 
signing of a new international climate agreement for the post-2012 period1. As no 
consensus on emission targets has been reached yet, emission targets means that the 2007 
EU proposal is still the relevant benchmark to consider in the international post-2012 
climate policy debate. Therefore, we try in this paper to contribute to the understanding 
of the international negotiation process by investigating the strategic incentives of 
different key international players to accept the conditions of the EU proposals. 
The objective of our analysis is not normative (i.e. what countries ought to do in order to 
combat future climate change), but rather descriptive (i.e. what self-motivated countries 
are likely to do). Methodologically, we use some game theoretic coalitional stability 
analysis to explore the strategic incentives of six major players to ratify an international 
climate agreement: the USA, Japan, the EU, China, the former Soviet Union (FSU) and 
Rest of the World (ROW). For an introduction on the use of game theory to analyze the 
formation of international environmental agreements, we refer, among others, to Barrett 
(2003, 2005), Chander and Tulkens (2006) or Finus (2001, 2003). Given the strong 
heterogeneity among countries in terms of costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, the research questions raised above can only be addressed by simulations with 
a numerical integrated assessment model. For that purpose we will use the CLIMNEG 
World Simulation CWS model (see Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) or Bréchet, Gérard 
                                                 
1
 For more information on the outcome of the Bali conference, see: 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php  
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and Tulkens (2007) for a description) which is an integrated assessment model adapted 
for coalitional analysis from the RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). 
We will compare two alternative scenarios reflecting the EU proposal to a reference 
scenario based on the Kyoto agreement. The reference Kyoto scenario assumes that the 
developed countries that ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol continue cooperating after 
2012 and determine their emission targets by maximizing their joint discounted welfare 
and adopt an international emission trading system among agreement members. The first 
alternative scenario is labeled EU unilateral commitment scenario and assumes that the 
EU commits itself to an emission ceiling of maximally 80% (i.e. 20% reduction) of its 
1990 emission level for all periods after 2020. The second alternative scenario is called 
Annex-B multilateral commitment scenario and assumes that all Annex-B countries 
observe an emission ceiling of 70% (i.e. 30% reduction) compared to 1990. For the last 
two scenarios, we consider two variants depending on the way the additional 
commitment makes use, or not, of emissions trading. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodological framework 
and the reference Kyoto scenario is presented in Section 3. Section 4 deals with the EU 
unilateral commitment scenario and section 5 discusses the Annex-B multilateral 
commitment scenario. Conclusions and directions for further research are presented in 
section 6. 
2. The modeling framework: integrated assessment and coalition theory 
The methodological innovation of our approach is to use both an integrated assessment 
model and game theoretical arguments to answer the policy questions raised above. The 
main characteristics and assumptions of the model and the way it is used are described in 
this section. 
Our integrated assessment model, named CWS (CLIMNEG World Simulation model), 
resembles closely the original RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996) or variations 
on it as in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003).2 We denote by { }1, 2, ,= …N n  the set of all 
countries in the world and we assume that, while choosing climate policy actions, 
                                                 
2
 See Kelly and Kolstad (1999) or Kolstad and Toman (2005) for an introduction and overview of 
integrated assessment climate-economy models.  
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countries’ policy makers weigh the benefits (avoided future climate change damages) and 
costs (costs of re-orientating their economies towards lower carbon emissions level). 
While speaking about welfare, we will refer to some notion of Green National Product 
that takes into account both climate change damages and emission reduction costs. More 
precisely, welfare in a particular country or region will depend on the stream of 
discounted consumption, 
,i tZ  . By denoting ρ  the discount rate, t the time period and Ω  
the time horizon, welfare will be given by:  
(1) ( ) [ ]
,
, ,1 ,2 , 1
1
, , ,
1
i t
i t i i i t
t
Z
W Z Z Z
ρ
Ω
Ω
−
=
=
+
∑…  
Because climate change has long term impacts the time horizon considered in the model 
is 300 years. In every region and period, the following resource balance relation holds: 
(2) 
, , , , , ,i t i t i t i t i t i tY C D Z I X− − = + +  
where 
,i tY  denotes market value of production, i.e. conventional gross domestic product. 
,i tC  and ,i tD stand for emission abatement costs and climate change damages, 
respectively. One may interpret the left hand side of equation (2) as “green GDP” of a 
country in a particular time period, i.e. conventional GDP corrected for the costs of 
emission reduction and damages incurred from climate change. The right hand side of 
equation (2) displays the uses of green GDP: either goods and services are consumed 
(
,i tZ ) or invested ( ,i tI ) for generating more capital stock in future periods. The variable 
,i tX  denotes possible transfers (positive or negative) of resources between regions. For 
instance, in case there is an emissions trading scheme, the financial transfers related to 
these trade transactions are captured in this variable. Equation (2) is a budget constraint 
saying that not more can be used for consumption, investment and transfers then what is 
produced in every period.  
Production is assumed a function of labor and capital. Total factor productivity increases 
exogenously over time and capital accumulation is endogenous in the model. Technical 
details about the production function and capital accumulation can be found in Eyckmans 
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and Tulkens (2003). Production causes emissions of greenhouse gases according to the 
following relationship: 
(3) 
, , , ,
1σ µ = ⋅ − ⋅ i t i t i t i tE Y  
The parameter 
,
σ i t  denotes the emissions-output ratio. It is assumed to decline 
exogenously over time as a result of technological progress. Still, emissions can be 
further reduced at a rate 
,
0 1µ≤ ≤i t  by means of specific measures, like replacing a coal 
fired power plant by renewable energy sources, investment in more fuel efficient cars or 
energy demand management. The costs of taking action typically are increasing with the 
emission reduction rate, ( ), ,µ=i t i i tC C . These costs represent annualized investment 
costs for emission abatement equipment or alternative energy production technologies, 
output forgone and consumer welfare losses. Emission abatement cost functions are 
relatively easy to estimate, see for instance Chapter 11 in the IPCC (2007) Working 
Group III Report for a recent overview on cost estimates. We use in the CWS model cost 
estimates taken from the RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). 
Emissions of greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere, thereby disturbing the 
global carbon cycle and causing ultimately climate change. We capture the complex 
physical processes in the following general relationship: 
(4) ( ),1 ,2 ,, , ,∆ = …t N N N tT g E E E  
Temperature change at time t is defined relative to some base year (the pre-industrial era) 
and depends upon the global carbon emissions history from period 1 to period t. Behind 
this general specification is hidden the complex physical reality of the global carbon 
cycle and temperature change processes. 
Temperature change has a variety of physical impacts, among which sea level rise, 
changes in precipitation patterns and extreme weather events. The economic valuation of 
the damages caused by these impacts is summarized in a damage function, 
. Damage functions are hard to estimate, see for instance the Stern Review 
(2006) or IPCC (2007) Working Group II Report. First, physical impacts are difficult to 
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estimate, even though several studies are available, such as for sea-level rise (Marbaix 
and Nicholls, 2007). Second, evaluating non-market damage, such as biodiversity losses 
and changes in living amenities, remains challenging, for no market prices are available 
for their valuation. Further, weighting costs and benefits requires normative judgments 
regarding intergenerational justice and intragenerational justice (i.e. weighing costs and 
benefits accruing to different generations over time or to citizens that differ strongly in 
wealth position within one particular generation). .  
In spite of the inherent difficulties with the cost-benefit framework, it remains a useful 
tool for climate policy analysis because it gives insights in the basic determinants of 
countries stance on climate change policy issues.  
We now turn to the analysis of the EU proposals. We start by describing the three 
different scenarios: the reference Kyoto scenario, the EU unilateral commitment scenario, 
and the Annex-B multilateral commitment scenario. These scenarios differ from each 
other in terms of membership of the international climate agreement and emission 
reduction commitment. The following table summarizes the main elements of the three 
scenarios.  
Table 1: Coalition membership and commitment in alternative scenarios 
scenario 
number 
 1 2 
scenario 
name 
Reference Kyoto 
scenario 
EU unilateral 
commitment 
Annex-B multilateral 
commitment 
USA out out -30% 
Japan in in -30% 
EU in -20% -30% 
China out out out 
FSU in  in -30% 
ROW out out out 
 
Legend:  
“in”: this country/region is member of an international climate agreement and its emission 
target is calculated in an endogenous way as to maximize discounted group welfare;  
“-20%” and “-30%”: this country is member of an international climate agreement and 
commits to a 20% or 30% emission reduction in 2020 and all future periods;  
“out”: this country is not a member of an international climate agreement and determines its 
emission strategy as to maximize individual welfare  
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3. Reference situation: the Kyoto coalition 
As a reference situation throughout the paper we will consider the Kyoto coalition, that 
is, the current coalition formed by the developed countries which ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol and committed themselves to an emission target, Japan, EU and Former Soviet 
Union in the CWS model. It is assumed that these countries continue cooperating and 
agree on carbon emissions ceilings that maximize their joint welfare. This reference 
coalition is one particular Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) in carbon 
emissions among others.3 The Kyoto coalition members coordinate their emission 
strategies as to maximize their joint welfare taking as given the equilibrium emissions of 
the non-members. Outsiders for their part maximize their individual payoff taking as 
given the equilibrium emissions strategies of other outsiders and of the Kyoto coalition. 
The resulting emissions allocation satisfies the following marginal first-order condition 
for all Kyoto member countries: 
(5) [ ] 1, , , ,
1 1
:
1
ji
t
t j Si t i t i t N t
DC gi S
Y E T
τ
τ
τ τσ µ ρ
Ω
− +
= ∈
∂∂ ∂∀ ∈ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂∆+∑ ∑
 
where S represents the coalition. According to expression (5), agreement member i 
reduces its emission in period t in such a way that the marginal cost of reducing one more 
ton of carbon (i.e. the left hand side of (5)) equals the discounted sum of all future 
marginal damages due to additional temperature change caused by this additional unit of 
reduction (right hand side of (5)). At any point in time, Kyoto members internalize all the 
future negative climate damage externalities of their carbon emissions, to the extent that 
it affects their fellow coalition members. Climate damages affecting non-members are not 
taken into account by the members of the coalition.  
Note that this condition implies that marginal emission abatement costs are equalized 
among all Kyoto Protocol members, which implies that their overall emission reduction 
target is achieved in a cost efficient way. Cost efficiency prevails when market based 
environmental policy instruments are used, as it is the case with the flexible mechanisms 
of the Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                 
3
 For a precise definition of this game theoretic solution concept, see Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997). 
See Eyckmans and Finus (2006a, 2006b) for an analysis with the CWS model of all possible PANEs.  
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The countries outside the Kyoto coalition take into account their own individual climate 
change damages, neglecting negative climate change externalities to other countries: 
(6) [ ] 1, , , ,
1 1\ :
1
i i
t
ti t i t i t N t
C g Di N S
Y E T
τ
τ
τ τσ µ ρ
Ω
− +
=
∂ ∂ ∂∀ ∈ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂∆+∑
 
Starting from this reference situation, which reflects the current state of international 
climate agreements, we can explore the implications of the unilateral EU strategy. We 
present now two scenarios designed for that purpose and reflecting the Council’s 
proposal.  
 
4. The EU unilateral commitment scenario 
4.1 Description  
In this first scenario it is assumed that, starting from the Kyoto coalition, an additional 
constraint is imposed which requires that EU’s carbon emissions cannot exceed 80% of 
their 1990 emissions level for all time periods beyond 2020.4 Two cases will be 
considered in our scenario, depending on whether emissions trading is allowed or not.   
Without emissions trading the following additional constraint is added to the Kyoto 
coalition optimization problem for the EU: 
(7) 
, ,19902020 : [1 0.20]EU t EUt E E∀ ≥ ≤ − ⋅  
It results that, in that coalitional equilibrium, the distribution of the reduction effort 
among the Kyoto coalition is no longer cost-efficient. Marginal abatement costs are 
equalized among all unconstrained coalition members but are now higher within the EU.5 
Since this difference in marginal abatement costs is hard to reconcile with the assumption 
that the Kyoto coalition fully makes use of market based environmental policy 
instrument, such as emissions trading, we therefore consider a second variant including 
full emissions trading.  
                                                 
4
 As the time step of the CWS model is 10 years, the transition path cannot be displayed. 
5
 Marginal abatement costs will be higher only if the unilateral commitment entails stronger reductions than 
in the reference unconstrained Kyoto coalition equilibrium. In other words, only if constraint (7) is binding, 
marginal abatement costs between agreement signatories will be different. 
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In the variant with emissions trading a constraint is introduced in the whole Kyoto group 
emissions instead of individual emissions constraints for the EU only, as in (7). The new 
emissions constraint in replacing (7) in the optimization problem for the Kyoto coalition 
now writes, 
(8) 
, ,
ˆ2020 : j t j t
j S j S
t E E
∈ ∈
∀ ≥ ≤∑ ∑  
For the ‘constrained coalition member’, the EU, we set 
, ,1990
ˆ [1 0.20]EU t EUE E= − ⋅ , i.e. 
20% below 1990 emission levels. For all other coalition members, we set 
,
ˆ
j tE  equal to 
their emission level in the reference Kyoto coalition scenario.  
The difference between the variants with and without emissions trading lies in the 
flexibility regarding where, and thus at what cost, emission reductions are actually taking 
place. In the scenario without emissions trading (equation (7)), the constrained countries 
have to perform all additional reduction effort domestically. In the scenario with 
emissions trading (equation (8)), any additional reduction commitment by one agreement 
member leads to higher demand and higher equilibrium prices for permits in the permit 
market. In that case, the additional reduction commitment can be shared over the 
different coalition members in a cost efficient way. 
Regarding the initial allocation of permits in future commitment periods, we assume that 
all unconstrained agreement members get exactly their emissions of the reference Kyoto 
allocation. Constrained members’ initial allocations (the European Union) are in line with 
their individual reduction commitment. Hence, initial permit holdings coincide with 
,
ˆ
i tE  
as defined above and financial transfers related to permit trade transactions are captured 
by the transfer variable 
,i tX  in every country’s budget balance equation (1): 
(9) 
, , ,
ˆ
i t t i t i tX p E E = ⋅ −   
The equilibrium price tp  of emissions permits in period t corresponds to the shadow 
price of the joint emissions constraint (8).  
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4.2 The key issue of “carbon leakages” 
From our computations it turns out that the EU unilateral commitment of limiting by the 
year 2020 its emissions to 80% of its 1990 emission level represents a more stringent 
emission policy than what the EU would be committed to under the reference Kyoto 
scenario. This will constitute a crucial point in our analysis. Actually, the additional 
emission reduction by the EU gives something like a ‘climate bonus’ to other countries 
since they will be confronted with lower climate change damages, which increases, 
everything else equal, their welfare. We will call this effect the climate externality effect 
of the EU’s unilateral commitment. In the environmental economics literature, 
considerable concern has been raised about the fact that this positive externality gives 
other countries an incentive to lower their own contribution to solving the global climate 
change problem, see for instance Hoel (1992). This is called carbon leakage6 and results 
from free riding reactions under the assumed selfish behavior of non-participating 
countries.  
Though theoretically undisputable, the relevant policy question is whether this carbon 
leakage effect would be so strong that the EU’s additional emission reduction effort is 
partially (or even completely) compensated by an increase in emissions by other 
countries. Because of the further decrease of EU emissions in comparison with the 
unconstrained scenario, world emissions and carbon concentrations are reduced, and the 
temperature rise is smaller, ceteris paribus. Therefore, climate damages borne by all 
regions are reduced, leading to a decrease in damages in all countries. Consequently, 
some more resources are available to be spent in consumption (variable  in (2)), 
investment in physical capital (variable 
,i tI  in (2)) and on emission mitigation measures 
(variable 
,i tC  in (2)). The objective of each country being to maximize its net welfare 
over time, it chooses its optimal strategy under the following trade-offs:  
• to increase its green consumption, (which does not yield further emissions);  
                                                 
6
 Carbon leakage is a more general term that is used for other spillover effects in international climate 
policy as well like for instance, delocalization of carbon intensive industries to non-participating countries. 
In this paper, the term carbon leakage only refers to strategic climate policy reactions by governments. 
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• to invest in physical capital infrastructure so as to increase production in the 
forthcoming periods, (and consume more later on, leading to higher emissions 
during the periods when production is increased);  
• to abate more emissions now to curb the temperature increase and avoid future 
damages.  
In the following analysis, it is important to keep in mind that abatement efforts, and thus 
temperature increases, are endogenous in the CWS model in the sense where they result 
from the cost-benefit analyses undertaken in each country. Furthermore, the outcome of 
these cost-benefit analyses is coalition-dependent. Full numerical results of the 
simulations are reported in Table 2 in the appendix. We will focus here on the 
interpretation of these results. 
4.3 Slight carbon leakages, but welfare gains for outsiders 
A first observation is that the 20% unilateral reduction commitment implies a real cut in 
EU’s emissions. EU should reduce its emissions by an additional 24% in 2020 compared 
to what would have done in an unconstrained Kyoto scenario (see appendix, table 2). 
Outsiders (i.e. countries having no commitment) react only marginally to the EU’s 
unilateral action. They increase their own emissions by about 0.13%, with some 
differences among countries: the USA +0.18%, China +0.34% and Rest of the World 
+0.03%. Carbon leakage elasticity is therefore extremely small. This constitutes a very 
positive signal from an environmental standpoint: an additional cut by one percent by the 
EU triggers an increase of only 0.005% by the outsiders, which can be seen as 
negligeable. Hence, carbon leakage to non-ratifying countries should therefore be little a 
concern. The reason for this moderate reaction is most likely the fact that future marginal 
climate change damages (hence marginal benefits of emission reductions) are rather 
insensitive to changes in current regional emissions due to the strong inertia in the carbon 
cycle and climate system. The fact that the CWS model considers a very long time span 
(which is adequate concerning global warming) may explain that result.  
In spite of their small reaction in terms of carbon emission increases, outsiders of the 
Kyoto coalition do gain in terms of welfare: USA gains about 0.31%, China 0.62% and 
ROW 1.02% in the constrained compared to the unconstrained Kyoto scenario. This 
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observation is important because it shows that EU strategy generates small, though not 
negligible, free riding incentives in other countries. Countries that do not participate in 
the Kyoto Protocol are better off if protocol members increase the efforts to limit their 
emissions and slow down global climate change. The same holds true for the other Kyoto 
ratifying countries. Japan and Former Soviet Union react similarly as the non-ratifying 
countries: they increase slightly their emissions in response to the EU’s proposal in the 
absence of emissions trading (Japan +0.23% and FSU +0.53%). The reason is that they 
enjoy the same positive climate externality bonus as non-members. In spite of their 
reaction, the overall emissions of the Kyoto group go down because the additional 
commitment of the EU outweighs the other members’ emission increases, which is the 
objective pursued by the EU. 
4.4 The key role of emissions trading 
The picture for agreement members looks different if a system of emissions trading 
among the Kyoto countries is assumed. In that case, other ratifying countries also 
decrease their actual emissions strongly after an additional commitment by the EU: Japan 
minus 9.32% and Former Soviet Union even minus 21.82%. The reason for the marked 
difference is that under emissions trading, it is profitable for the EU to buy some 
emissions permits in the market instead of meeting their minus 20% reduction 
commitment by means of internal emissions reduction projects only. As a result, the 
additional EU demand for permits pushes the equilibrium market price up and induces 
other market participants to produce more emission reduction. Through the permit price, 
the different signatories’ reduction efforts are positively linked. This type of linkage is 
not present in the absence of emissions trading.  
Both with and without emissions trading, the Kyoto coalition experiences a loss in 
welfare. This is obvious because the constrained Kyoto outcome is also a feasible 
solution to the unconstrained Kyoto welfare maximization problem. Adding an additional 
constraint on the effort allocation cannot but lead to a decrease in the optimal welfare of 
the group. The loss is more pronounced without emissions trading (-0.72%) than with 
emissions trading (-0.37%). Without trading, the allocation of efforts is not cost efficient 
for the Kyoto coalition. Trading allows for more flexibility in the abatement burden 
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allocation and results in a cost efficient allocation of reduction efforts over all Kyoto 
members. Compared to the incomplete trading solution, the full trade equilibrium allows 
cutting total compliance costs by half. 
4.5 On the stability of the Kyoto coalition 
The overall welfare loss of the unilateral commitment for the Kyoto group implies that 
there is a smaller surplus compared to free riding payoffs, i.e. the welfare levels that 
current members can achieve if they would leave the coalition. The Kyoto coalition with 
20% emission reduction for the EU would not be stable in a game theoretical sense. 
Making such commitment is a political choice that is not “rational” in the game theory 
framework: the sum of the payoffs within the coalition is not large enough to compensate 
for the welfare loss in the EU. The unconstrained Kyoto coalition (our reference Kyoto 
situation) was able to produce more welfare than the sum of the payoffs of their members 
under complete absence of cooperation7 (i.e. the so-called Nash equilibrium). Given this 
surplus, there are numerous ways to redistribute the gains of cooperation (for instance 
through an appropriate initial assignment of emission permits under an emission trading 
scheme) such that every individual member is better off joining than not joining. This can 
be seen in Table 4 in appendix. Without cooperation (Nash equilibrium), the Kyoto group 
{Japan, EU, FSU} achieves a payoff of 1421.59 trillion US$2000, which is slightly less 
than in the reference scenario (1422.28 trillion). However, due to the unilateral 
commitment by the EU (scenario 1), the overall surplus for the Kyoto coalition drops to 
1416.99, which is well below 1421.59 under the Nash scenario. In spite of that, the 
members of the coalition apart from EU (i.e. Japan and FSU) are still better off than in 
the reference situation. The stability of the coalition is thus maintained as long as he EU 
is willing to incur the loss to achieve its mitigation policy.  
                                                 
7
 Implicitly we assume here that if a member would defect from the Kyoto coalition, the agreement would 
completely collapse and we would revert to the complete absence of cooperation. Practically speaking, this 
is consistent with the ratification thresholds in the Kyoto Protocol. Theoretically speaking, this assumption 
corresponds to the notion of the core in cooperative game theory, see Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997). 
However, it should be noted that there are other free riding notions in which it is assumed that after 
defection by one member, the remaining coalition members continue cooperating (see Barrett 2005). The 
later interpretation of free riding leads to even higher free riding incentives and would reinforce our 
arguments on (in)stability of the Kyoto coalitions. 
15 
 
 
 
 
Global temperature increase by 2100 amounts to +3.5°C without EU’s unilateral 
commitment, versus +3.4°C with 20% additional commitment. Overall, the impact of the 
sustained minus 20% objective on temperature levels is limited because of the relatively 
small share of Kyoto countries in global emissions, and because of the relatively weak 
emissions target of 80% of 1990 emissions levels. We are well aware that it is very likely 
that for future periods beyond 2020 more ambitious targets and unilateral commitments 
might be implemented.  
Global welfare increases by 0.33% (without emissions trading) or 0.42% (with emissions 
trading) compared to the reference Kyoto scenario. The welfare increase is due to the fact 
that the unconstrained Kyoto scenario is globally strongly inefficient given our damage 
parameters and discount rate. Global carbon emissions are too high compared to the 
global optimal level that maximizes world welfare. Thus, the EU’s unilateral 
commitment is a move into the direction of the global optimum.  
5. The Annex-B multilateral commitment scenario 
5.1 Description 
We now turn to the second part of the EU proposal: the conditional reduction by 30% if 
other developed countries are willing to assume similar reduction objectives. This may be 
interpreted as further abatements efforts within Annex-B countries. This strategy of the 
EU resembles what is called a tit-for-tat strategy, see Axelrod (1984), in repeated non-
cooperative games8. Tit-for-tat strategies essentially mean that every player copies the 
strategy played by its opponent in the previous period. So, I cooperate if I observe that 
you cooperated in the previous period. But I will deviate if I observe that you deviated in 
the previous period. This type of strategies is a special case of the more general class of 
trigger strategies that all share the characteristic that they contain some kind of credible 
punishment threat if the opponent deviates. It is well known that this type of future 
punishment possibility can be sufficient to sustain in an infinitely repeated game a 
cooperative solution as a Nash equilibrium. This is the so-called “folk theorem”; see 
among others, Montet and Serra (2003) for an introduction.  
                                                 
8
 Strictly speaking, environmental games with stock pollutants do not belong to the class of repeated games 
since the accumulation of the stock pollutant changes the fundamentals of each stage game. However, due 
to the strong inertia in the stock accumulation process in the CWS model, the comparison with repeated 
games is justified. 
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The EUs conditional strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2020 if the 
other developed countries follow can be interpreted as a kind of tit-for-tat strategy. Only 
if the EU observes that the other industrialized countries are willing to assume similar 
reduction efforts, the EU reduces its emissions by 30%. In the other case, EU reverts to 
its original proposal of minus 20% unilateral reduction. For a tit-for-tat strategy9 to work 
well, it is of crucial importance that the punishment part of the strategy be sufficiently 
harsh to deter non-cooperative behavior by the other industrialized countries.  
In order to test whether the 30% proposal can generate incentives for current non-
members of the Kyoto Protocol to join, we compare the EU’s unilateral commitment 
scenario (scenario 2) to a new scenario, called Annex-B multilateral commitment, in 
which the USA joins the club and all members of the expanded agreement observe an 
emission ceiling of 70% of their 1990 emissions level.10 Like before we distinguish 
between a solution with and without emissions trading. See Table 3 in appendix for the 
detailed results. 
5.2 EU trigger strategy may work 
Computations with the CWS model reveal that the surplus of the expanded coalition is 
always higher in the multilateral -30% scenario than in the EU alone -20% scenario. 
Hence, including the USA and observing the 70% of 1990 emissions ceiling would 
constitute a clear welfare improvement for the expanded group of countries. Interestingly, 
allowing for emissions trading or not does not fundamentally alter the conclusion. The 
natural question is therefore: would it be possible to give an incentive for the USA to join 
the coalition? 
In Table 4 we summarize the relevant welfare data for USA and the Kyoto coalition for 
all scenarios considered. We observe from Table 4 that USA would be worse off joining 
the club compared to the EU unilateral commitment scenario, their welfare level would 
                                                 
9
 Admittedly, there are some interpretation difficulties. First, the climate change problem is strictly 
speaking not a repeated game. In every subsequent period, the game is slightly different because of the 
accumulative nature of greenhouse gas emissions. But in the short run, we believe the situation can be 
approximated as a repeated game. Also the fact that the EU’s proposal remains vague on its longer run 
strategy complicates the interpretation of its proposal as a tit-for-tat strategy. 
10
 This is a simplification of the EU negotiation position, as the Council refers to “comparable” reductions: 
these might not be numerically exactly the same, but our scenario lies in the appropriate range, specifically 
as we consider a possible redistribution of initial allocations within the coalition. 
17 
 
 
 
 
decrease by 19.13 trillion US$2000 (1410.72 versus 1391.59). Hence, the USA have little 
incentive to join the Kyoto coalition despite the EU commitment. However, this 
conclusion about the individual payoff of one member of the coalition is to be interpreted 
with great care because it depends strongly on the initial allocation of permits and, hence, 
of possible revenues or expenses of permit sales and acquisitions. The relevant question 
is whether the expanded group can be stabilized with some appropriate transfers (i.e. 
appropriate initial allocations of permits).  
This question can be answered by having a careful look at Table 4 again. For the USA to 
be willing to join the Annex-B multilateral commitment with trade scenario (scenario 2, 
with trade), they need at least a pay-off of 1410.72 trillion US$2000. This leaves 2845.36 – 
1410.72 = 1434.64 for the original Kyoto members. This is more than what these original 
Kyoto members can achieve under the “Kyoto coalition + EU minus 20 with trade” 
scenario (1416.99, according to Table 4) and even more than under the plain “Kyoto 
scenario” (1422.28, according to Table 4). Hence, it is possible to design a transfer 
scheme (for example, an initial allocation of permits) such that the USA can be persuaded 
to join the Kyoto group which observes a 30% reduction target. In other words, there is 
sufficient payoff in the expanded coalition to pay for the USA free riding claim and also 
to preserve a sufficient surplus to make all original Kyoto members better-off compared 
to both of our scenarios. However, this would require a substantial additional amount of 
permits to be given to the USA compared to the -30% uniform allocation that was 
assumed in scenario 2. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we compare two different scenarios referring to the European Council 
international climate initiative of February 2007. We first consider a reference situation 
based on the current Kyoto Protocol coalition in which only the countries committed to a 
quantified target under the Kyoto protocol are assumed to continue cooperating in the 
future. In order to predict future emission strategies by this Kyoto coalition and other 
non-members we adopt the Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium (PANE) concept of 
Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997). This concept implies that agreement signatories 
coordinate their emission strategies by maximizing their joint welfare and take as given 
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the emissions by non-members. Outsiders to the agreement are assumed to maximize 
individual welfare taking emissions of all other countries as given.  
This reference situation is confronted with a scenario in which the EU commits 
unilaterally to an emission reduction of 20% compared to 1990 (scenario 1) and a 
scenario in which all Annex-B countries multilaterally commit to a minus 30% compared 
to 1990 strategy (scenario 2). For these two scenarios we distinguish between two polar 
cases, an inflexible (no emissions trading among countries of the coalition) and a flexible 
(emissions trading is allowed) burden sharing case.  
The main findings are as follows: 
1. In all scenarios, the model reveals that carbon leakages caused by free riding 
behavior of outsider countries in reaction to unilateral or multilateral emission 
reduction are not a concern. The reaction of the outsiders is quite limited (the 
elasticity of their emissions w.r.t. a change in the EUs emissions is smaller than 
0.01 in absolute value). The reason for the weak carbon leakage effect is that 
marginal damages from climate change prove to be relatively insensitive to 
changes in regional emissions’ reduction effort. 
1. Under the first scenario, the main strategic effect occurs within the coalition. 
When emissions trading is allowed, a unilateral additional commitment by one 
member drives up the market price of permits considerably, which therefore 
induces the fellow coalition members to reduce their emissions in order to sell 
tradable emission permits. Through the permit price set up in marker equilibrium, 
reduction efforts by the coalition members are interconnected. Thus, under an 
emissions trading system, unilateral commitment of EU to reduce its emissions by 
20% leads to a decrease 2.5% of accumulated global emissions between 2000 and 
2100 and to an increase in global welfare by 0.4%. 
2. Without emissions trading, in the same scenario, the effect on global emissions 
and welfare is a little smaller. The main reason for this is that without emissions 
trading, the overall emission target is produced in a cost inefficient way. This cost 
inefficient production of abatement induces a slightly less ambitious overall 
emission commitment for the Kyoto coalition as a whole.  
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3. Concerning the conditional strategy to reduce emissions by 30% if other 
industrialized countries follow (the scenario 2), from the model the implicit threat 
to revert to 20% unilateral emission reduction is too weak to induce countries like 
the USA to join the climate agreement and to accept a 30% reduction 
commitment without emissions trading. In welfare terms, USA is better off free-
riding on the 20% Kyoto coalition than joining the Kyoto group under a joint 
minus 30% target without trading. When trading is allowed, the results are 
markedly different as it becomes possible to redistribute coalitional surplus 
through permit trading and alternative initial allocations of permits. We showed 
that it is in principle possible to design a transfer scheme (and therefore an initial 
allocation of permits) such that the USA can be persuaded to join the Kyoto group 
which observes a 30% reduction target. There is sufficient payoff in the expanded 
coalition to pay for the USA free riding claim and still to retain sufficient surplus 
to make all original Kyoto members better off compared to the EU unilateral 
commitment scenario with trade (scenario 2) and even the reference Kyoto 
scenario.  
4. All scenarios that we studied indicate that the unilateral commitment proposed by 
the EU may induce current non-members to the Kyoto Protocol to join in the 
future, conditional upon a substantial redistribution of the gains of cooperation. 
This redistribution of the cooperative surplus is an essential element to achieve 
effective and stable international climate policy in the long run. In a system of 
emissions trading, it should be implemented by means of an initial allocation of 
permits that explicitly takes into account free riding claims by coalition members. 
Transfer schemes like those of Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) and Eyckmans 
and Finus (2003) offer explicit formulae to determine an initial permit allocation 
which is incentive compatible in this sense. 
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Appendix: the carbon cycle in CWS 
 
 
The version of CWS used in this paper includes the simplified representation of the 
carbon cycle presented in Nordhaus and Boyer (1999) for the DICE model, also found in 
its latest versions (Nordhaus, 2007). It is important to note that this version of DICE 
addressed part of the critics that applied to older versions, based on Nordhaus (1991). We 
use this formulation mainly because it is simple and computationally efficient. However, 
we are aware that it has limitations (Joos et al., 1999), in particular the non-linear 
processes associated with carbon accumulation, and particularly oceanic absorption, are 
not represented. A detailed investigation of this issue in the CWS framework is provided 
in Marbaix and Gérard (2008). 
The climate part of the CWS model is equivalent to the DICE/RICE model (Nordhaus 
and Boyer 1999), namely it include two boxes representing fast and slow temperature 
change, the latter being associated with the bulk of the oceans. However, the parameters 
have been changed so that the results are close to results presented in the IPCC 4th 
assessment report (IPCC, 2007) for one of the atmosphere- ocean general circulation 
models, the UK Met Office HadCM3. The aim of this calibration is to obtain global 
average temperature changes that follow an up to date climate model quite closely. While 
the uncertainty associated with climate can be explored by calibrating CWS to other 
complex climate models (Marbaix and Gérard, 2008), here we selected a model that is 
widely recognized in the climate modeling community and provides results “close to the 
middle of the range”, possibly a bit above that, particularly in the first decades. CWS 
provides higher temperature changes than the 1999 version of DICE, and it is also 
somewhat above results from the 2007 version of DICE although this one also has an 
higher sensitivity to greenhouse gases compared to older versions. In summary, this is far 
from the highest climate sensitivity that could be possible, but it is certainly provides 
plausible estimations of climate change that are not in the lower part of the range of 
values currently obtained by complex models. 
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Table 2: EU unilateral commitment (scenario 1) 
 Kyoto plus EU minus 20 
 
 
Reference 
Kyoto 
scenario no trading trading 
temperature change 2100 3.455 3.404 -1.47 3.404 -1.48 
carbon concentration 2100 1523.607 1501.344 -1.46 1501.211 -1.47 
carbon price 2020 54.98 n.a. n.a. 112.78 105.12 
Kyoto  226.615 179.347 -20.86 179.035 -21.00 
Non-Kyoto 1576.286 1578.229 0.12 1578.256 0.12 
accumulated 
emissions 
2000-2100 World 1802.902 1757.575 -2.51 1757.291 -2.53 
USA 1.882 1.886 0.18 1.886 0.18 
Japan* 0.324 0.325 0.23 0.294 -9.32 
EU* 0.932 0.705 -24.39 0.848 -9.06 
China 1.721 1.727 0.34 1.727 0.34 
FSU* 0.517 0.520 0.53 0.404 -21.82 
ROW 5.047 5.048 0.03 5.049 0.03 
Kyoto 1.773 1.549 -12.63 1.546 -12.82 
Non-Kyoto 8.65 8.661 0.13 8.662 0.13 
regional  
emissions 
2020 
World 10.424 10.211 -2.04 10.207 -2.08 
USA 1406.37 1410.70 0.31 1410.72 0.31 
Japan* 294.43 295.11 0.23 295.98 0.53 
EU* 1033.18 1021.93 -1.09 1024.34 -0.86 
China 1426.79 1435.65 0.62 1435.69 0.62 
FSU* 94.67 95.03 0.38 96.67 2.11 
ROW 1613.48 1630.01 1.02 1630.09 1.03 
Kyoto 1422.28 1412.08 -0.72 1416.99 -0.37 
Non-Kyoto 4446.64 4476.36 0.67 4476.51 0.67 
World 5868.93 5888.43 0.33 5893.49 0.42 
regional 
discounted 
welfare 
 
  (%)  (%) 
Legend 
Countries denoted by * are members of the international climate agreement, underlined numbers refer to 
the fact that the emission constraint in binding in 2020 and % refers to percentage change compared to the 
reference Kyoto coalition (first column). 
Temperature change is measured in degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial era. 
Carbon emissions and concentrations are reported in gigatons of carbon.  
The carbon price is measured in $ (of year 2000) per ton of carbon, and all welfare figures refer to the 
discounted sum of payoffs between 2000 and 2300 and is measured in trillion US$ (1012 US$) of the year 
2000).  
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Table 3: Annex-B multilateral commitment scenario (scenario 2) 
 Annex-B minus 30 
 
 
Reference 
Kyoto 
scenario  
+ USA 
no trading trading 
temperature change 2100 3.390 3.133 -9.33 3.178 -8.02 
carbon concentration 2100 1496.041 1384.318 -9.14 1401.707 -8.00 
carbon price 2020 111.154 n.a. n.a. 221.58 302.99 
Kyoto  453.364 266.279 -48.05 304.178 -40.65 
Non-Kyoto 1292.101 1246.273 -3.42 1245.009 -3.52 
accumulated 
emissions 
2000-2100 World 1745.465 1512.552 -16.10 1549.187 -14.07 
USA* 1.686 0.938 -50.17 1.387 -26.32 
Japan* 0.295 0.213 -34.19 0.253 -21.98 
EU* 0.850 0.617 -33.84 0.733 -21.37 
China 1.728 1.782 3.54 1.776 3.21 
FSU* 0.407 0.430 -16.77 0.251 -51.47 
ROW 5.049 5.066 0.38 5.065 0.36 
Kyoto 3.238 2.198 -39.87 2.624 -28.22 
Non-Kyoto 6.777 6.848 1.18 6.841 1.08 
regional  
emissions 
2020 
World 10.015 9.046 -13.21 9.465 -9.20 
USA* 1407.06 1389.11 -1.23 1391.59 -1.05 
Japan* 294.78 298.30 1.31 298.13 1.25 
EU* 1034.74 1043.46 0.99 1042.61 0.91 
China 1436.73 1514.42 6.14 1510.64 5.88 
FSU* 94.30 97.45 2.93 113.04 19.40 
ROW 1631.63 1763.74 9.31 1757.92 8.95 
Kyoto 2830.88 2828.32 -0.01 2845.36 0.59 
Non-Kyoto 3068.36 3278.16 7.82 3268.56 7.51 
World 5899.24 6106.48 4.05 6113.92 4.17 
regional 
discounted 
welfare 
 
  (%)  (%) 
Legend 
Countries denoted by * are members of the international climate agreement, underlined numbers refer to 
the fact that the emission constraint in binding in 2020 and % refers to percentage change compared to the 
reference Kyoto coalition (first column in Table 2). 
Temperature change is measured in degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial era. 
Carbon emissions and concentrations are reported in gigatons of carbon.  
The carbon price is measured in $ (of year 2000) per ton of carbon, and all welfare figures refer to the 
discounted sum of payoffs between 2000 and 2300 and is measured in trillion US$ (1012 US$) of the year 
2000).  
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Table 4: Coalitional welfare comparison 
 scenarios 
 
Nash 
equilibrium 
Reference 
Kyoto 
1 
EU 
unilateral 
commitment 
2 
Annex-B 
multilateral 
commitment 
Kyoto 
{Japan, EU, FSU} 1421.59 1422.28 1416.99 1453.77 
USA 1405.53 1406.37 1410.72 1391.59 
Kyoto + USA 
{USA, Japan, EU, FSU} 2826.12 2828.65 2827.71 2845.36 
Legend  
Nash equilibrium refers to complete absence of cooperation under which every country maximizes its 
individual welfare taking as given similar behavior by all other countries. Emissions strategies would 
neglect environmental externality effects are governed by expression (5) for all countries/regions and time 
periods. 
Figures refer to welfare measured as the discounted sum of payoffs between 2000 and 2300 in trillion US$ 
(1012 US$) of the year 2000. 
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